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Abstract In his book Superintelligence, Nick Bostrom points to

several ways the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) might
fail, turn out to be malignant or even induce an existential
catastrophe. He describes ‘Perverse Instantiations’ (PI) as cases,
in which AI figures out how to satisfy some goal through
unintended ways. For instance, AI could attempt to paralyze
human facial muscles into constant smiles to achieve the goal of
making humans smile. According to Bostrom, cases like this
ought to be avoided since they include a violation of human
designer’s intentions. However, AI finding solutions that its
designers have not yet thought of and therefore could also not
have intended is arguably one of the main reasons why we are so
eager to use it on a variety of problems. In this paper, I aim to
show that the concept of PI is quite vague, mostly due to
ambiguities surrounding the term ‘intention’. Ultimately, this text
aims to serve as a starting point for a further discussion of the
research topic, the development of a research agenda and future
improvement of the terminology.
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1

Introduction

Recently, the importance of being in control of what Artificial Intelligence (AI) does
has moved to the center of attention. There appears to be a broad consensus that
AI should not do what we homo sapiens do not want it to do. The concept of
Perverse Instantiations (PI) consequently describes cases where AI succeeds to
achieve goals but does so in violation with our intentions. For instance, best-selling
author and philosopher Nick Bostrom brought forward the thought experiment of
AI choosing to paralyze human facial muscles into constant smiles to achieve the
goal of making humans smile. Of course, similar more or less realistic cases can be
constructed for various domains. AI might for instance attempt to achieve the goal
of reducing maternal mortality by sterilizing all male homo sapiens, or to improve
schoolchildren’s grades by providing them with the answers to the next test
beforehand. While ultimately, the goal is achieved in each scenario, the way it was
achieved was not intended.
According to Bostrom, PI ought to be avoided because of the violation of human
designer’s intentions. In this paper, I aim to show that the current concept of PI is
quite vague, mostly due to inaccuracies surrounding the term ‘intention’. The
prevailing terminology, if we took it seriously, would force us to label most ways of
achieving goals that were uncovered by AI as unintended and consequently, as PI.
Ultimately, this text serves as a starting point for a further discussion of the research
topic and aims to provide reasoning why we should look deeper into the matter at
hand.
2

The Meaning of ‘Intention’

At first glance, Bostrom’s definition of PI as AI “discovering some way of satisfying
the criteria of its final goal that violates the intentions of the programmers who
defined the goal”1 sounds reasonable. In essence, he claims that AI going against the
intentions of its designers might lead to undesirable outcomes. But what is the real
meaning of ‘intention’ that he has in mind when framing his notion of PI? Revisiting
the thought experiment of producing smiles, Bostrom explicates that violating
intentions is to be understood as “not to do what the programmers meant when

1

Bostrom 2017, p. 146
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they wrote the code that represents this goal”2. But what did they mean when they
tasked AI with coming up with ways to make humans smile? To answer that, we will
take a short detour into the realm of Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a state-of-theart example and the technologically simplest instance of AI that Bostrom himself
uses when describing PI.
RL is a subfield of AI and Machine Learning that is focusing on automatically
learning optimal decisions over time. For simplicity’s sake, imagine a mouse-in-alabyrinth kind of experiment. Within the maze, the designer randomly places nondeadly traps and delicious food. A mouse, conceptually referred to as an RL agent3,
is placed in the maze and can perceive its environment through its senses. Of course,
its objective is to try and obtain as much food as possible without getting hurt by
the traps.4
To achieve its goal, the digital rodent can mix and match actions from a finite list of
actions called the action space, i.e., turn around, move, wait, gnaw, jump etc. RL can
then be understood as repeatedly putting the same mouse into very many mazes to
finally make it learn to automatically choose the optimal combination of actions
from its action space to maximize the aggregate reward, i.e., eat the maximum
amount of food while stepping into the fewest traps.5
3

Perverse Instantiations Emerging from Underspecified Goals

If we were to transfer the concept of RL to Bostrom’s example of tasking AI to
make us smile, we encounter a few challenges. Initially, we would need to adequately
represent the goal in a way so that we can give our agent feedback on how well it
has done, which includes translating ‘make us smile’ into a form that the AI can
understand. First, it is up for interpretation what counts as a smile. Second, it is
unclear whether the AI is meant to achieve the maximum number, duration, intensity
etc. of smiles. Third, the term ‘us’ is ambiguous and contextual, potentially leaving
us with an AI that might produce a lot of smiling corpses.

Bostrom 2017, p. 147
I use the term ‘agent‘ here in the sense in which it is used in the domain of Reinforcement Learning.
4 See Lapan 2020, pp. 1–5
5 Ibid.
2
3
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Making humans smile by paralyzing facial muscles might not be intended, but if what
is intended is not made explicit in the goals, a RL agent will not be able to take it
into account, as it is only interested in maximizing goal achievement, thus reward
gain.
As shown with Bostrom’s own example, it is in fact not the case that AI discovered
a loophole to perversely instantiate the sought-after goals. The problem appears to
be the programmers’ vague formulation of goals.
Yet, if there is so much room for interpretation, how can we then speak of a violation
of intentions? If I kindly ask you to prepare a sandwich for me, and you go ahead
and fix up a ham and cheese sandwich, can we really speak of you violating my
intentions because unbeknownst to you, I am a vegetarian? It is my firm believe that
we should not put the blame on the sandwich-maker if he only knew half of what
was truly expected of him.
4

Perverse Instantiations Emerging from the Way Goals Are Achieved

Let us, however, assume, that there are cases in which the goals are in fact stated in
a way such that the intentions of the programmers are absolutely and unmistakably
clear. Could there still be PI? Bostrom’s examples strongly imply that even clear-cut
goals can be perversely instantiated by employing unintended ways to reach them.
Reconsidering our mouse-in-a-labyrinth scenario, the finite list of actions that the
mouse can take to interact with the maze is called the action space. It can be
understood as a kind of toolbox that programmers infuse their RL agents with to
act in the environment.
However, there are two ways I can think of by which a finite list of actions might
still circumvent the designer’s intentions. First, knowing all individual actions might
simply not be sufficient to check for conformance. For instance, if our mouse in the
maze would be able to act in three distinct ways, a solution to optimize reward gain
might include chaining together these actions up to ten times, which already amounts
to well over 500 possible combinations. There is a significant chance for
combinations that the programmers never would have thought of, and therefore,
could not have been intended by them.
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Second, unexpected interactions between agents and complex environments in RL
leave ample room for PI. Researchers tasked RL agents to play hide and seek against
each other, and the emerging collaborative strategies far exceeded what was initially
anticipated. To win, seekers learned to surf on crates by exploiting the way
movement was implemented. By doing so, they were able to overcome the shelters
that hiders had built as part of their defensive strategy6. The sheer range of things
that agents could do in the game world was simply ungraspable for humans
beforehand, which lead to unintended solutions, even though the goal was never
unclear or misunderstood.
5

The Intention of Violating Intentions

By design, RL scenarios aim to produce optimal solutions for gaining some reward
with minimal or no explicit instructions on how to do so. In a way, RL agents having
the freedom to experiment within some boundaries is exactly what we intend to do
when employing that kind of AI. So, following our arguments from the previous
sections, should we label every instance of AI not doing what the programmer meant
as PI?
When Lee Sedol, one of the best Go players on the planet, sat down to play against
AlphaGo, an AI trained by way of RL, the human champion lost four out of five
rounds. Move 37, which the AI came up with in the second game, stunned Sedol.
In thousands of years of humans playing Go, nobody had ever come up with
something as inhuman, unique, or creative.7 But what were the intentions of the
designers of AlphaGo? Clearly, they meant to design an AI that can play and excel
at Go. Obviously, Move 37 was intended insofar as it is in accordance with the goal,
which I loosely interpret as win at Go by playing the game by the rules. But did the
programmers intend Move 37? Arguebly, they did not. Move 37 was unexpected for
the opponent, the spectators and even more so for the creators of the AI. AlphaGo
itself estimated that a human player would have played this move with a probability
of one in 10,000 but decided to go for it anyway 8.

See Baker et al. 2020, p. 6
See Holcomb et al. 2018, p. 68
8 See Holcomb et al. 2018, p. 70
6
7
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Bostrom does slightly hint at his account of intention being tied to the way goals are
achieved in the sense of a method, and not the goals themselves9. If this is the case,
labeling cases as PI boils down to the question whether we can at the same time
intend to search for the optimal way of satisfying a goal and already know the result
of the search. Searching for a solution and already intending it seems contradictory.
However, if we tasked AI to make us smile, play Go or eat food and avoid traps, any
case of it achieving these goals through unintended ways would still have to labeled
as PI. It appears that simply reducing PI to unintended ways to achieve goals is not
enough to clearly explain the problem arising from applying AI in such scenarios.
6

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that the concept of PI hinges on the definition of
‘intention’ and consequently, what the intention latches on to. I have concluded that
PI arising from underspecified goals are simply a matter of intentions not being laid
out to AI in an understandable, unmistakable, and complete manner. By no means
would we be justified to declare our creation at fault, because everything it does is
directed at what it knows about our intentions, expressed through goals, and
achieving them.
Additionally, I have discussed that even for cases in which intentions are perfectly
clear to AI, there still is room for PI based on actions and interactions with the
environment not being fully understood by designers beforehand. It appears
contradictory to claim to have intended a particular way of achieving a goal which
AI just now discovered. In contrast, not every time some goal is achieved in a way
that designers were previously unaware of is unintended, and thus a case of PI.
It is clear that the definition of ‘intention’ plays a pivotal role in identifying PI.
However, as I have shown, there is more work to be done on the terminology. First,
a starting point for further conceptual contribution to the topic could be an
investigation of a potential conflation of the terms ‘unintended’ and ‘unanticipated’
in the context of unintended consequences. This distinction could shed some light
on the issue of mislabeling cases as PI.

9

See Bostrom 2017, p. 147
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Second, empirical research could be conducted with regards to what cases of AI,
humans or other animals achieving goals through unintended ways people would in
fact label as PI. Consequently, bias for or against our artificial creations and fellow
planet dwellers could be identified and elaborated on.
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